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Financial Statement Fraud 
FINANCIAL STATEMENT FRAUD: INTENT - THE FINE LINE 
Samantha Weis 
Introduction: 
Dr. Catherine Whelan 
Faculty Sponsor 
In 2001, Enron was forced to file bankruptcy due to fraudulent 
accounting practices (Enron) . In 2003, the CEO of HealthSouth was 
charged with $1.4 billion in accounting fraud (SEC). In 2002, the SEC 
filed charges against former senior executives of Rite Aid for many 
fraudulent accounting practices including overstating net income by 
$1.6 billion (SEC). 
Riding the waves created by the above-mentioned fraudulent activ-
ities, it is difficult for investors and the general public to trust com-
panies and their financial statements. After much research on the 
underlying causes of fraud and ways to detect it, the key component 
of fraud is intent. Intent is the fine line between fraud and ea rnings 
management. Earnings management is the act of smoothing income 
to make a company more attractive to investors. Investors, as a gen-
eral rule, do not desire to invest in companies with volatile earnings. 
Timing investments, sales, and expenditures are legitimate ways of 
smoothing earnings (Magrath and Weld 2002). The problem begins 
where the legitimacy ends. Fraud can be difficult to detect because, 
obviously, the people committing fraud are also committed to hi'ding 
it. 
F ASB Pronouncements: 
All FASB pronouncements are relevant to fraudulent accounting 
due to the fact that fraud occurs when the procedures described by the 
pronouncements are not adhered to. In 2002, President Bush signed a 
new law that was designed to reform business practices in an attempt 
to make it more difficult to report fraudulently. The law is the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. 
Implications: 
According to Magrath and Weld (2002), in 1998, Chairman of the 
SEC, Arthur Levitt expressed his concern on the issue of earnings 
management, and threatened any company suspected of the act. He 
failed to draw a distinction between abusive earnings management 
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and normal earnings management. He did, however, list techniques 
that suggested he was talking exclusively about fraudulent earnings 
management, such as cookie jar reserves, creative acquisition 
accounting, big bath restructuring charges, immaterial incorrect 
applications of accounting principles, and premature recognition of 
revenues. Since these sorts of techniques are hard for investors and 
other outsiders to detect, Magrath and Weld (2002) offer some early 
warning signs that companies may be exercising fraudulent account-
ing practices. 
The first warning sign is the failure for cash flows to correlate with 
earnings. Cash flows should correspond with earnings. If they do not 
match, there is a possibility that revenues are being artificially 
increased by early recognition or false sales. Receivables should also 
correlate with revenues. The failure to be correlated could be a sign 
that the company is recording false sales or receivables. The 
allowance for doubtful accounts not matching the receivables account 
is a sign that they may be purposefully understating or recording false 
sales. Reserve accounts should be correlated with particular balance 
sheet items, such as warranties, future commissions, and allowance 
for doubtful accounts. These not matching their counterparts could 
indicate earnings manipulations. Acquisition reserves should be close-
ly scrutinized for their legitimacy by investors. There is the possibili-
ty, if a company has large reserves for acquisition of new assets or 
restructuring, they are overstated. The last of the warning signs that 
Magrath and Weld (2002) offer is too much consistency. Companies 
that consistently meet analysts' expectations are possibly exercising 
fraudulent accounting. The incentive to practice fraudulent account-
ing is the company's desire to meet these expectations to protect their 
value and reputation in the market. 
Geriesh (2003) expresses the relationship between organizational 
cultures and accounting procedures through research of 160 compa-
nies, half of which had been convicted of issuing fraudulent financial 
reports and the other half of which had not been found guilty of such 
practices. Geriesh (2003) compared the organizational culture of the 
fraudulent companies to those companies not guilty of fraudulent 
accounting. The first cultural behavior in question was related-party 
transactions. The other behavioral questions include the history of the 
company relative to fraudulent behavior, the influence of founders on 
the board of directors, and the influence of CPA's on the board of direc-
tors. 
The findings of Geriesh (2003) indicate there is a correlation 
b~tween_ these behaviors and fraudulent activities within companies. 
Firms with more founders and less CPA's on the board of directors are 
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more likely to behave fraudulently than companies without these 
characteristics. Firms that are involved in related-party transactions 
are also more likely to use fraudulent accounting procedures. Also, 
there appears to be a trend in the history of the fraudulent compa-
nies. Companies that have not committed fraud before are less likely 
to commit fraud than those who have done it in the past. This is also 
consistent with the ideas of Magrath and Weld (2002), who believe in 
the domino effect. Once a company prematurely recognizes revenue, 
they must continue to do so in order to keep up with analysts' expec-
tations. 
Hotaling and Lippitt (2003) feel part of the blame for the rise in 
fraudulent accounting is due to FASB itself. They believe that in 
order to comply with FASB pronouncements, accountants are not 
allowed to exercise much judgment and, therefore, are not able to 
adhere to the basic structure that supports the pronouncements and 
our reporting rules. They make their case based on the fact that all 
FASB pronouncements are not all-inclusive and some are extremely 
complex. Not all types of transactions are covered by the pronounce-
ments and, therefore, some transactions have to be defined by the 
rules in order to be accounted for in a specific manner. The rules that 
Hotaling and Lippitt (2003) mention are as follows: accounting for 
leases, research and development (R&D) expenditures, stock options, 
and special purpose entities (SPEs). 
The guidelines used for determining whether a lease is capital or 
operating provides some scope to structure the lease so that, regard-
less of the actual economic reality of the transaction, it meets the com -
pany's needs. For example, a company can lease an asset for 74.9% of 
the estimated useful life of the asset and still classify it as an operat-
ing lease even though for the majority of the life of the asset it will be 
in the lessee's control. R&D expenditures are to be expensed immedi-
ately according to GAAP because FASB feels that it is difficult to 
measure future economic benefits from these sorts of expenditures . 
Hotaling and Lippitt (2003) feel that this is inappropriate because 
many of these expenditures produce assets that clearly increase the 
value of the company's stock. While FASB feels that the fair value 
method of accounting for stock options is more reflective of actual eco-
nomic costs, they allow companies to use the intrinsic method as long 
as the fair value method is disclosed in footnotes . Hotaling and 
Lippitt (2003) feel that this is due to F ASB conceding to pressure from 
industries and politics. Accounting for SPEs is another area of con-
cern. A lessee can avoid consolidating special purpose entity's state-
ments if one of the following guidelines fails to be met: the SPE was 
created specifically to solely benefit the lessee, the lessee guarantees 
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the SPE's debt, and the lessee owns at least 98% of the equity in the 
SPE. For example, if a lessee creates a SPE specifically for its own 
benefit and guarantees its debt, the debt does not have to show up 
anywhere but in the notes if at least three percent of the SPE is owned 
by someone else. 
Hotaling and Lippitt (2003) feel it is time for FASB to do something 
about some of these pronouncements. They are opposed to F ASB being 
dictated by politics, especially when the end results are not in con-
junction with the real economic picture . They also express their con-
cern that accountants and auditors are not allowed the freedom to use 
educated judgment in order to express the economic reality of a com-
pany in their financial statements. 
Phillips, et al. (2003) explored the possibility of using deferred tax 
expense as a tool for detecting earnings management. The idea they 
share is that, because of the differences in tax laws and GAAP, man-
agers can report less income for tax purposes by creating temporary 
book-tax differences. For example: managers can play with deprecia-
tion expense to have their financial statements show the net income 
they desire, but not pay taxes on the increased income because for tax 
purposes they can only use certain depreciation measures and GAAP 
is fairly flexible regarding the type of depreciation and the length of 
the useful lives of depreciable assets. Their research is based on the 
prior research of Mills and Newberry (2001), which provided evidence 
that firms with more incentives for earnings management have larg-
er book-tax differences than firms with fewer incentives. 
Phillips, et al. (2003) tested three hypotheses: (1) the effectiveness 
of using deferred tax expense to detect earnings management to avoid 
a decline in earnings; (2) using deferred tax expense to detect earnings 
management to avoid a loss; (3) and using deferred tax expense to 
detect earnings management to avoid failing to match analysts' fore-
casts. Their samples consisted of only United States corporations 
because foreign companies have different accounting issues. They 
excluded financial institutions and utilities because they would have 
different incentives for managing earnings. They also excluded part-
nerships and other flow through entities because they do not account 
for income tax expense. They could only include information starting 
after SFAS No 109 became effective, since it caused many changes in 
GAAP for income tax reporting purposes. Their statistical research 
was based on formulas derived from the previous research of 
Bugs~a~ler and Dichev (1997), Healy (1985), Dechow (1995, 2002). 
Ph1lhps, et al. (2003) found their results to support two out of three 
of t~eir hypo~heses. They found that deferred tax expense can be use-
ful m detectmg earnings management in regards to avoiding losses 
6 
Financial Statement Fraud 
and avoiding reporting a decline in earnings but not in avoiding fail-
ing to match analysts' forecasts. They suggest that further research 
take the following into consideration: managerial guidance, compo-
nents of deferred tax expense, and the usefulness of deferred tax 
expense in other settings. 
Beneish and Vargus (2002) explored insider trading as a basis for 
determining earnings quality and the impact of accruals on earnings 
management. They suggest that, based on the fact that managers 
have relevant private information about economic factors that affect 
earnings quality, they can and will trade based on this information. 
They also suggest that auditors and investors fail to realize the poten-
tial for earnings management through accruals. They show that com-
panies with income-increasing accruals and unusual insider selling 
have abnormal accruals that suggest ea rnings management and a 
larger tendency to report larger profits due to income-increasing 
accruals. They propose that investors should be made aware of insid-
er trading. Their research is based on the belief that stock prices cre-
ate expectations of earnings quality. 
The beliefs of Beneish and Vargus (2002) led them to several 
hypotheses. Their hypotheses propose that the relevance of income-
increasing accruals and income-decreasing accruals can be suggest ed 
by insider buying and selling, and that the expectations caused by 
market prices fail to reflect the relevance of insider trading. Their 
sample began with all of the companies listed on the Compustat 
Industrial, Research, and Full Coverage 1998 tapes for the years 1985 
through 1997. They excluded financial service companies, companies 
without December year ends, companies with discontinued operations 
that were equal to more than five percent of total assets, and those 
without enough information to compute accruals. They ended up with 
a sample consisting of 3,906 firms from 1985 through 1996. They 
retrieved their insider trading information from the National 
Archives Center for Electronic Records and from Thomas Financial. 
Their statistical research formulas were based on prior research on 
insider trading by Baesel and Stein (1979), Nunn et al. (1983), Seyhun 
(1986), and Lin and Howe (1990). 
The research of Beneish and Vargus (2002) shows that insider trad-
ing is a relevant factor in determining earnings quality and the impor-
tance of accruals. Th_ey provide evidence that investors tend to have 
faith in the quality of income-increasing accruals and that the rele-
vance of income-increasing accruals is linked to insider selling and 
buying. Income-increasing accruals, along with insider buying, is a 
sign of higher quality accruals. Income-increasing accruals, along 
with insider selling, is a sign of lower quality accruals . They suggest 
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that future research take the following into consideration: isolation of 
the motives of insider trading, the separate components of accruals, 
and basis of investors' optimism related to companies. 
Conclusion: 
In a capitalistic society, it is imperative that investors be able to 
trust the worthiness of financial statements, accountants, and audi-
tors. Fraud detection is key to the survival of our society. It is almost 
impossible to determine the intent of key decision makers of corpora-
tions, but it is easy to be leery of any inconsistencies in their state-
ments and accounting practices. 
There are many ways of committing fraud: premature revenue 
recognition, insider trading, inflating reserve accounts, playing with 
accruals, exploiting the differences between financial accounting and 
tax accounting, just to name a few. The best way to detect fraud is to 
be aware that it exists in many different forms. Fraud is a major prob-
lem, not just for the companies who practice it or the accountants and 
auditors linked with fraudulent companies, but also for the account-
ing profession. Reputation is key to the future of any profession. 
Detecting fraud is important in protecting the reputation of the 
accounting profession. 
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